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In Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671, Robert Pasnau describes Aquinas’s and Henry of 
Ghent’s views on the ontological nature of some of Aristotle’s categories as “structures.” 
Although not based on a medieval term, Pasnau suggests that the term ‘structure’ 
captures their penchant for reductionism and deflationism about the lesser accidental 
categories (such as action and passion, and perhaps position). “Structure” is a useful 
notion because it is “ontologically innocent: it is an attempt to account for how the world 
is organized, but without postulating any further items in the world.”1 In this critical 
paper reflecting on Pasnau’s magisterial and invaluable work, I shall focus on this 
reductive interpretation of Aquinas’s view of categories. Since there is certainly good 
textual reasons supporting Pasnau’s interpretation, I shall present a view that focuses on 
explicit discussions of categories in Aquinas’s corpus. On this basis, I argue that Aquinas 
should be considered a non-reductionist and realist regarding categories; or at least 
Aquinas attempted to achieve this status. However, to do so, we must grant Aquinas 
some idiosyncratic approaches to metaphysics (in comparison to later scholastics)—some 
views which, nevertheless, I believe are defensible and philosophically fruitful. This 
analysis will lead me to close with a broader assessment of Pasnau’s work that may be 
helpful in thinking about approaches to the history of metaphysics in the later medieval 
and early modern periods. 
 In his chapter on “Real Accidents,” Pasnau identifies Aquinas’s view on accidents 
as deflationary. A deflationary account of accidents holds that accidents “do not exist in 
the same sense that substances exist”2; and that “talk of an accident’s existing is best 
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understood as shorthand for a substance’s existing in a certain way.”3 Although there are 
stronger formulations of deflationism about accidents that has eliminitivism as its limit,4 
Aquinas’s view fits this weaker characterization nicely because he says things like, 
“whiteness is said to exist not because it subsists in itself, but because by it something has 
existence-as-white.”5 Thus, Aquinas is weakly deflationary about accidents since he held 
that substance is what properly exists—not accidents—and accidents are ways in which 
the substance exists accidentally. For example, snow is white because of whiteness.6 
Of course, concerning this view, there arises suspicion about the metaphysical 
separability of accidents, even if only under miraculous conditions (such as 
transubstantiation). In fact, despite Aquinas’s deflationism about accidents, due to the 
fact that accidents are forms—and in this sense principles of actuality—Aquinas holds 
that it is metaphysically possible that accidents can be conserved by the power of God 
even without a subject.7 How this is understood to work is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but as we shall see, this point about forms as principles of actuality is important for 
establishing a realist interpretation of Aquinas on categories. 
Given Aquinas’s deflationism, it may not be surprising that Pasnau interprets him 
as holding a reductionistic account of some of the categories. As mentioned, Pasnau 
describes Aquinas’s view of categories as structures. Whereas Aquinas clearly does not 
have a reductionist view of substance, quantity, quality and perhaps relation, it is possible 
that any or all of the remaining categories—Place Where, Time When, Position, Having, 
Action, Passion—do not each pick out any true kind of entity. Along these lines, Pasnau 
suggests that Aquinas “endorses the idea that each of the categories marks off a distinct 
kind of being, but without supposing that there is a one-to-one mapping from categories 
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to basic entities.”8 He is led to this from Aquinas’s view that there are cases where one 
and the same thing can be classified into more than one category. For example, the same 
change (motus) can fall either under Passion or Action; such as when a single specific 
event can be expressed either as falling under Action—“Mary built this table”—or under 
Passion—“This table was built by Mary.” Pasnau suggests that it would be odd for these 
two sentences to involve different metaphysical commitments since the only difference is 
between the active and passive voices. Although Aquinas holds that there is a basis in 
reality between action and passion (“to build” is different from “to be built”), this does 
not mean there is not some more basic entity that these reduce to: viz., the change itself 
(which Aquinas sees as being just one actuality for any agent-patient pair). For this 
reason, Pasnau thinks that the notion of structure is helpful: the lesser categories are 
ontologically neutral and are fundamental ways in which the world may be arranged 
without mapping reality at its most fundamental level. In a footnote, Pasnau states that 
Aquinas holds this structure view for perhaps all categories except Substance, Quantity, 
and Quality.9 When coupled with the deflationary view of accidents, what Pasnau’s view 
seems to amount to is that although some categories pick out distinct ways in which the 
substance exists, between some categories—such as Action and Passion—distinct ways 
in which the substance exists are not picked out in virtue of a real distinction between 
them. 
Having introduced Pasnau’s view, I want to broaden the scope of the discussion 
beyond Pasnau’s book by examining Aquinas’s ontology of categories. I am doing this in 
hopes of presenting Aquinas’s view as both deflationary regarding accidents and non-
reductionist regarding categories.10 Not only do I think that Aquinas is a non-reductionist 
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about categories, but I also think that such an analysis can serve as an opportunity for 
assessing Pasnau’s book. Specifically, I think that the trouble in interpreting Aquinas is 
found (1) in his lean and yet realist ontology, and (2) his reliance on an analysis of 
cognitive acts to support ontological distinctions. However, in order to accept Aquinas’s 
view of categories as realist, there are some controversial points that must be granted to 
Aquinas, not the least of which is the real distinction between existence and essence, the 
analogy of being, and a kind of isomorphism between thought and reality. As many of us 
are aware, each of these themes are subject to misinterpretation and sophistical and 
incoherent application. 
The way through which we shall examine categories will be first to reflect on the 
role that predication plays in Aquinas’s view of categories, and then to discuss how 
categories are a way of mediating being through distinct essences. 
The debate over the categories usually orbits around the question about whether 
they are linguistic, conceptual, or real features of the world. Understanding this debate 
often becomes confused because of linguistic or conceptual approaches that some 
thirteenth century scholastics take to identifying the list of categories (and because of the 
debate over how Aristotle’s Categories relates to the methodological study of logic and 
metaphysics). For example, Aquinas and Albert Magnus both advocate establishing the 
list of categories by reflecting on various modes of predication. This has led both 
contemporary and medieval thinkers (such as Scotus) to conclude that as a result of such 
a technique Aquinas has only succeeded at best in providing a rational distinction of the 
categories and not a real one.11 Although we shall look at the role that predication plays 
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in identifying the list and nature of the categories for Aquinas, first it is important to 
identify a previous question about the role that categories play in human cognition. 
Far from being known in a derivative manner, Aquinas says in De potentia 7.9 
that categories are fundamentally ordered to the first things understood by the intellect 
(prima intellecta), which are things existing extra-mentally.  
Because relation is rather weak among all the categories, for this reason, certain 
men supposed that it was from the second things understood (secundis 
intellectibus). For the things first understood are things beyond the soul; with 
respect to cognizing such things, intellect is drawn at first. However, the second 
things understood are called intentions consequent upon the mode of 
understanding; in this second (hoc secundo), the intellect understands itself  in 
however much it reflects upon itself, understanding itself to understand, and 
[understanding] the mode by which it understands. According then to this 
position, it might follow that relation is not among things beyond the soul, but in 
the intellect alone, just like the intention of genus and species, and second 
substances. This, however, cannot be possible. For something is placed in no 
category unless as a thing (res) existing beyond the soul. For a being of reason is 
divided against being divided by the ten categories (Meta. 5).12 
 
Here, Aquinas is equating categories with extra-mental things. As first intelligibles, these 
have cognitive priority to those things that follow upon our understanding. Far from 
being derivative or dependent on our thought, Aquinas seems to be saying that since 
categories are related to the first things understood by us, they are grouped-in with that 
which is cognitively foundational. Importantly, Aquinas also says that “a being of reason 
is divided against being having been divided by the ten categories.” This is seen in the 
fact that although a category can be understood as a genus, they are directly predicated of 
things themselves, whereas the predicate “genus” cannot. 
What is presupposed in the above discussion is Aquinas’s theory of abstraction: 
that which exists extramentally becomes known by us through the process of abstraction 
in which the extramental content becomes unified in the mind as independent of the 
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existence conditions of the thing existing extramentally.13 The categories themselves are 
part of the content contained in the mind upon a primary understanding of things—that 
which is most general in such an understanding—and as such are identified with the 
extramental things themselves. This distinguishes categories from logical beings since 
these are secondarily divided against the being that is divided by the ten categories. In 
this way, there is a priority to the division of the categories in our understanding of the 
world to the division of our thoughts of them. In conjunction with this prior division, the 
intellect combines and separates predicates and subjects.14 
However, each category identified with extramental things are not known in a 
way fully independent of substance.15 In fact, each accidental category is known 
concretely in relation to substance, even though each accidental category can be signified 
independently of it. An accidental essence or form can be distinctly identified from the 
essence of substance.16 
Given that predicates are identified with the things of which they are predicated, it 
is not surprising when Aquinas makes the famous claim in his Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics that categories divide being because “being is said to be in just as 
many ways as we can make predications.”17 That is, since our concepts are intrinsically 
ordered by distinct categories, and predicates can be truly predicated of their subjects, 
Aquinas believed that through a reflection on the essential relations between certain 
predicates and subjects one can identify the list of Aristotle’s categories; a list which he 
claims is finite.18 This allowed Aristotle to generate a logic of categorial predication; such 
as the rule that two predicates falling under different categories cannot be essentially 
predicated of each other.19 One of the things that predication shows us is that there are 
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predicates that cannot be predicated essentially of some things that other predicates can 
be essentially predicated of. For example, ‘color’ can be predicated essentially of 
‘whiteness’ but it cannot be essentially predicated of ‘human,’ even though ‘rational’ is 
predicated of ‘human’ in this way.20 
Forgoing a discussion of how Aquinas’s derivation of the categories (which I 
have treated elsewhere21), the more pertinent question for our purposes is whether 
Aquinas held that the results of such a distinction among the categories yields a division 
of essences. That is, does he conclude that the categories mark a division of things—a 
real division—rather than merely rational division? Scotus, for example, thought that the 
result of Aquinas’s derivation based on modes of predication is only a rational division at 
best, because differences in modes of predication are themselves only rationally distinct 
and do not imply a distinction of essences.22 This view is echoed by Pasnau when 
discussing Ockham’s view of categories: “the linguistic-conceptual items that fall into the 
categories pick out not a distinctive kind of thing, but merely substance and quality in 
some oblique way.”23 
What is implied in denying that Aquinas held that categories are divided 
essentially is that it is possible for essence x to fall under more than one category. 
Aquinas rules this out when he says that being signifies “the entity of a thing, as divisible 
by the ten categories,” and that being “is convertible with thing.”24 Since the 
transcendental res signifies the fact that beings have essence,25 what he is saying is that 
any being as divided by the categories is a thing and has an essence. No two essences 
falling under distinct categories will have any predicates in common (beyond ‘being,’ 
etc.). In this way, distinct categories are not themselves essences but express things that 
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are essentially distinct. One category is accidental to another, and so one thing cannot 
result from two, except accidentally.26 However, given the fact that being is analogically 
predicated of things falling under distinct categories, Aquinas also suggests that each 
thing falling under distinct categories have essences in different but related senses. 
Essence translated into the language of predication is definition. Definition 
demarks the whatness of a thing signified. When we look at how accidental things are 
understood essentially through predication, we see that a predicate can be concrete or 
abstract. Whereas the category substance is predicated of concrete things (e.g., “Socrates 
is a substance), accidental categories are predicated of abstract nouns (e.g., “Wisdom is a 
quality). Wisdom signifies the category of quality independently of its subject of 
inherence. Thus, “whatness applies to other categories because it makes sense to ask what 
something is.”27 In this way, all ten categories are essentially distinct. However, 
predicates that signify accidental categories have their concrete form predicated of the 
primary substances in which they inhere (e.g., “Socrates is wise). The concrete sense is 
important since it is directly applicable to, and abstracted from, fundamental things 
existing outside of the mind. When considering accidents in a concrete sense, there are 
differences when discussing the whatness of each accidental item per category. This is 
because the concrete term ‘wise’ signifies a subject insofar as it signifies wisdom after 
the mode of an accident.28 An accident, although when signified abstractly does not 
include the subject in its signification, when signified concretely, depends on, and is 
individuated by, its subject.29 All accidental essences are referred to substance as a 
primary kind of being because accidents involve the ratio of substance. For example, the 
ratio of quantity (considered in relation to a concrete predicate) includes the notion that it 
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is the measure of substance and quality includes the notion that it is the disposition of 
substance.30 In this way, accidents do not have a strict whatness as substance does but the 
nine categories have whatness and essence in an analogous way.31 Despite this condition, 
each category can be signified abstractly in a way independent of that in which it inheres. 
This indicates that there is some essential content not reducible to the essential content of 
its subject of inherence. 
Having discussed the categories as essential divisions of things, we can next 
discuss categories as a division of being. The connection between being and essence is of 
course Aquinas’s view that that by which and through which something exists is its 
essence. Thus, Aquinas says that “being is divided into ten categories as it is considered 
absolutely,”32 and that each thing falling distinctly under each of the ten categories is a 
complete being (ens perfectum).33 Sometimes he refers to entities falling under distinct 
categories as ens secundum se because they exist and have essence not reducible to the 
essence of substance.34 Since there are ten categories, each with independently signifiable 
essences that are classed by them, the single act of being that actualizes a substance is 
diversified qua beings in proportion to these essences. For this reason, any two essences 
falling under distinct categories will each be called distinct beings. As Aquinas says, 
accidents “have a proper mode of being in their proper essence…. In view of the fact that 
all accidents are forms of a sort superadded to the substance and caused by the principles 
of the substance, it must be that their being is superadded to the being of the substance 
and dependent on that being.”35 However, we must consider this in relation to the fact 
that things are essentially distinct from each other—even within one and the same 
substance. There is the one being of the individually existing substance but that one being 
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is directed and actualized according to the accidental essences inhering in it. As a result, 
there arises the deflationary view that accidents are ways in which the substance exists 
accidentally. 
However, there is more to the story. Aquinas sees the real distinction between 
essence and existence as having a strong role for a full understanding of the categories. 
The content expressed by the predicate is derived from abstraction from real things and is 
in itself independent of existential content. For example, the predicate ‘animal’ is 
understood independently of how humans exist—such as individual or as contingent, etc. 
For this reason, Aquinas holds that a quiddity can be within a category only if it is not the 
same as its existence.36 This is because things are contained in a category only with 
respect to their common nature or essence. This allows for things like material and 
immaterial substances—things with different modes of being—to be contained under the 
category of substance.37 The way in which a material substance exists is fundamentally 
different from the way in which an immaterial substance—like an angel—exists. This 
also leaves open the possibility of sorting things not only according to the logic of their 
common natures—under which the categories fall—but also according to their individual 
natures or existence: “Two things in the same category can still be diverse in the sense 
that they have diverse first subjects. He says that the diversity of the categories from the 
predication of being is considered by the logician because it is conceptual.”38 
This last point helps us to understand Aquinas’s view of accidental entities 
according to the modality of existence and as modes of being. Not only does each 
accident have its own essential content, but each also has its own way in which it is found 
to exist or found in nature. Whereas on one hand, a quality is essentially a disposition of 
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substance, on the other hand it is found in nature as existing in substance. For this reason, 
accidents do not exist independently of the being of the substance.39 However, Aquinas 
holds that not only does each categorial thing classify distinct sets of essences but distinct 
sets of modes of being as well. (Each distinction can be used to classify or identify each 
of the categories.) For example, although relations have their own essence, they also have 
the mode of being of “to something.”40 Also, quantity exists in such a distinct way from 
otherwise categorially classified entities insofar as they can themselves be the subject of 
distinct categorial entities.41 Cribbing Augustine, Aquinas defines ‘mode’ as “that which 
a measure determines: wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain 
measure.”42 In this way, modes of being are both measures of being of the substance as 
well as a determination of the substance itself. Accordingly, the being of a substance is 
divided into ten categories according to diverse modes of existence and are the ultimate 
determination that “this” is “that.”43 This is consistent with Aquinas’s view that accidents 
make the substance to exist accidentally in some way. Aquinas says that “from an 
accident and a subject results an accidental existence when the accident comes to the 
subject.”44 
 We can next address the topic of the composition of categorially distinct entities. 
That is, by addressing the real distinction between the modes of being and essence of 
categorial things we can now see how they exist in composition. 
 The logic of composition of accidents and substances is best expressed by 
Aquinas in his Commentary on the Metaphysics, where he shows us how accidents can be 
conceived concretely or abstractly: 
Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an accident when an accident 
is signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that 
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snubness is a concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus 
in order to signify that accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is 
signified in the abstract, after the manner of a substance, then the subject is given 
in its definition indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is the 
concavity of a nose.45 
 
Amplifying this is the following difficult passage from the De ente et essentia where 
Aquinas brings in the notion of modes of being in the determination of the composition 
of accident and substance: 
And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus cannot 
be taken from matter and their difference from form, as in the case of composed 
substances. Rather, their first genus must be taken from their way of existing 
itself, according to which the word “being” is diversely predicated of the ten 
genera according to a priority and posteriority; for example, an accident is called 
quantity from the fact that it is the measure of substance, and quality according as 
it is the disposition of substance, and so with the other accidents, according to the 
Philosopher in the fourth book of the Metaphysics. But their differences are taken 
from the diversity of the principles by which they are caused. And because proper 
attributes are caused by the proper principles of the subject, the subject is placed 
in their definition to function as the difference if they are defined in the abstract, 
which is the way in which they are properly in a genus; as when it is said that 
snubnosedness is the turned-up-ness of the nose. But the converse would be the 
case if their definition were taken according as they are said concretely. For in 
this way the subject is placed in their definition as a genus because they are then 
being defined after the manner of composed substance, in which the genus is 
taken from matter; as when we say that a snub nose is a turned up nose.46 
 
Aquinas argues that as categories every accidental category has a genus-difference-
species ordering, in a way similar to the example of how “continuous” and “discrete” are 
differences of quantity, except that the category itself is composed as a genus-difference 
union. Between these two passages, there seems to be four ways in which this can occur: 
in (1) pseudo-defining concrete accidents in which (1a) the subject serves as the genus 
and the categorial ordered accidental essence serves as its difference (e.g., snub contains 
the genus “nose” as differentiated by “snubness”); (1b) the mode of being of the accident 
serves as the genus and the accidental essence serves as the difference (e.g., existing 
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snubness contains the mode of being inesse47, which serves as the genus as differentiated 
by “snubness”); (2) pseudo-defining abstract categorially classed accidents in which (2a) 
the categorially classed accidental essence serves as the genus and the subject serves as 
the difference (e.g., snubness as differentiated by nose); (2b) the categorially classed 
accidental essences serves as the genus and the mode of being of the accident serves as 
the difference (e.g., snubness as differentiated by inesse). 
Although the abstract signification of an accident is what properly falls under a 
category, nevertheless, since the accidental essence adds to the notion of the being of the 
substance, the mode of being of the accident can serve to amplify the intelligibility of the 
nature of the accident itself. How this is done depends on whether one is considering the 
accident abstractly (categorially) or concretely (compositionally or existentially). If 
considered concretely, Aquinas suggests that an accident can be understood in such a way 
that that which signifies the essence itself should stand as a difference to the subject in 
which the concretely understood accident exists as its genus. Thus, “snubness” is a 
concaved nose such that snubness is a concrete property that includes nose as its subject 
and genus. A similar thing can be done when considering the relationship between how 
snubness is found to exist (as distinct from its essence) in relation to the substance in 
which it exists. However, if taken abstractly (and signifying the category itself), the 
accident will be the genus that has as its difference its subject in which it exists and has 
its mode of being. For example, concavity of the nose (abstractly conceived) is further 
specified by snubnosedness in that the latter is that in which the abstract concavity is 
realized or actualized.48 So, on the one hand, the accidental essence is actualized (as 
specific difference to genus) by the existing subject (the substance) whereas on the other 
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hand, the being of the substance is further concretely differentiated or determined by 
receiving a distinct mode of being through the distinct essence of the accident. 
Fundamentally, by adding the mode of being, there is allowed a fuller and more specific 
recognition of the distinctness of each categorial entity as its own thing, and ontologically 
diversified from every other thing, while including the unity that exists among these 
distinct ontological elements. The problem of each categorial thing not having a complete 
essence is resolved by showing how concrete and abstract accidental accidents relate to 
the being of the substance. 
 So, how does Aquinas conceive of how the categorial entities combine within a 
single substance? We have the particular challenge of answering Pasnau’s charge of 
reductionism with respect to some of the categories, especially regarding action and 
passion. How can Aquinas claim that action and passion are essentially distinct when 
there is a single event between them? In general, I think that the natural tendency to be 
reductive about Aquinas’s view of the latter accidental categories stems from the close 
connections that these categorial entities form, especially with respect to the deflationary 
order that arises in the subjection of one to another. Yet the principle seems to hold for 
Aquinas that as long as a distinct intelligible principle (hence a distinct essence) is able to 
be signified in a way distinct from substance (although still understood as ontologically 
dependent on substance), there arises the articulation of a new mode being within the esse 
of substance. In what follows, I provide some examples of this, which serve only as a 
rough sketch. 
 First, Aquinas maintains that among the accidental categories only relation does 
not imply a habitude to that subject of which it is predicated.49 With the other accidental 
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categories, there is within the grasp of each categorial being (not including substance and 
relation) an inherent semantic relation to that wherein it exists. As a consequence of this, 
each is conditioned by the subject in which they inhere. This gives these eight categorial 
beings the appearance of indistinctness from the subjects in which they inhere or are 
otherwise related. For example, he identifies body as “quantity having position.”50 Or, 
one can take the category of habit. In the Summa theologiae, Aquinas says that the notion 
of having can be understood in a variety of different ways: in one sense quality and 
quantity is “had” by substance. In another sense, a person “has” a friend. However, these 
distinct ways of having, which are post-predicamental, do not prevent the proper category 
of habit from being identified. Specifically, Aquinas identifies habit as follows:  
And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or 
passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, 
something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore 
the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “a habit is said to be, as it were, an 
action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those 
things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special 
genus of things, which are comprised under the category of habit: of which the 
Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and 
the man who is clothed.”51 
 
An important aspect in Aquinas’s identification of habit is that the having of one thing by 
another is mediated or has the intervening subject (medium) of action and passion. I think 
that one can interpret ‘medium’ here as that which is involved as a subject of a categorial 
essence insofar as it is included in its concrete pseudo-definition (although it can be 
signified abstractly in a way independently of these subjects). So, it seems that Aquinas’s 
view of habit is that it is an irreducible essence between two things (e.g., a man and some 
clothing) that is mediated by action or passion. To put it in terms identified above, 
habit—although signifiable according to its own principle of intelligibility—is pseudo-
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defined either abstractly or concretely in relation to modes of being and subjects of 
inherence. This is distinct from action, which does not include the notion of having. Habit 
betokens a relationship existing between a body and what is adjacent to it.52 
 The theme of unifying and explicating categorial essences along with various 
intervening subjects appears to be similar to the way he presents the other categories. For 
example, he says that “position is a disposition, which is the order of that which has 
parts,” but with the further determination, “with respect to place.”53 This runs parallel to 
Aquinas’s identification of quality as “disposition of substance” cited above in the 
passage from the De ente.54 This is interesting since although there is expressed a similar 
concept (“disposition of”), yet they are differentiated in that they are dispositions with 
respect to different subjects or mediums. Namely, the category of position implies the 
order of parts in place; and place can be considered a subject or medium of position. As a 
result of this, whatever is moved according to position must be moved according to 
place.55 
This brings us specifically to the categories of action and passion. Regarding 
these, Aquinas says that  
although motion is one, yet there are two categories which are based on motion 
depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental 
denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which as from something 
external the predicament of passion is taken; and the patient is some other thing 
from which something in denominated an agent.56  
 
This is an important passage for addressing Pasnau’s worry about action and passion. The 
motion (or event in Pasnau’s language) is indeed one, but it serves only as the subject or 
medium (viz., the basis) which requires further formal specification or differentiation. 
This further differentiation comes from both the cause of the action and the receiver of 
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the action. So, the essence of action arises from the agent itself and the motion, whereas 
the essence of passion arises from the passive subject and the motion. It seems that the 
agent, the passive subject and the motion are all merely subjects that serve as the genus of 
the categorial essences of action and passion themselves. That is, the categories of action 
and passion are based on the notions of acting cause and of effect,57 coupled with the 
single event of change itself. Regarding action and passion specifically, as with all the 
categories, action and passion have their own subjects, which include quality, quantity, 
where and when.58 
 Does this analysis that I have given prove that Aquinas is not a reductionist about 
categories even though he is a deflationist about accidental beings? I think that the 
answer to this question can come only with a broader discussion about ontological 
methodology and expectations. Of course, Aquinas sees his view as ontologically robust, 
but in doing so he asks us to approach his conclusions in a certain way. In fact, this brings 
me to what constitutes a broad assessment of Pasnau’s book. Although I have gone fairly 
quickly through some complicated issues in Aquinas’s metaphysics, right or wrong, an 
important lesson can be drawn from it in relation to the way that Pasnau approaches 
metaphysics in general in his book. Specifically, Pasnau seems resistant to entertaining 
the idea that conceptual or linguistic structures can be a valid way of articulating and 
establishing ontological concepts. This can be best illustrated by highlighting two 
passages from Pasnau’s book: 
If the substance-accident ontology does not fall out of the definition of what a 
substance is, then how does it arise? No doubt, part of its appeal comes from an 
uncritical reliance on the surface structure of language. Since language attaches 
predicates to subjects, it is easy to suppose that the world’s structure corresponds. 
This sort of simple-minded thought should have carried little weight with 
scholastic authors, however. They had at their disposal a variety of semantic 
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theories that explained predication without any commitment to a substance-
accident ontology, such as Ockham’s version of supposition theory, which he 
formulated in the interests of his own austere ontological program (pp. 106, 107). 
 
Compare that quote with the following one in which he is discussing a doctrine that is 
characteristic of nominalists: 
[The] characterization of the disagreement [between nominalists and realists] 
focuses on whether the surface structure of language corresponds to the structure 
of reality, in such a way that distinct terms match up with distinct things in reality. 
This, however, has little to do with the problem of universals; it refers mainly to a 
dispute over the categories (see Ch. 12): does every predicate across Aristotle’s 
categorial scheme—e.g., warm, six-feet tall, next to, sitting—have corresponding 
to it a real accidental form? (p. 86). 
 
I think in these two quotations we see, despite its heroic merits, a limitation in Pasnau’s 
approach. In not taking seriously metaphysical approaches through language, Pasnau 
bends his analysis to the side of the nominalist, even if this label is radically deficient. I 
think that his analysis as a consequence is forced to pass over a serious treatment of those 
historically sympathetic to a (Thomistic?) realism, which envisions, for example, that the 
best way of conceiving and mediating matter is through the propositional subject, form 
through predicates, existence through the predication of the copula, and inherence 
through a content expressed in the act of judgment. I think that this is unfortunate since 
an appealing aspect of Aquinas’s metaphysics is its leanness; a tightness that both gives 
rise to natural ways of understanding his metaphysical principles and to reductive moves 
on the part of his interpreters. 
                                                 
1
 Robert Pasnau, Metaphysical Themes: 1276-1671 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 
231. 
2
 Pasnau, p. 181. 
3
 Pasnau, p. 183. 
4
 Stronger deflationism is encapsulated by Pasnau later when he says the following: “it might seem 
that either one should endorse accidental forms as metaphysical parts that exist in their own right, as 
substances do, or else treat them as merely an aspect (a mode?) of the substance. In the latter case, 
however, it would seem odd to say, as Aquinas seems to, that a substance has multiple existences, 
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substantial and accidental. On a strictly deflationary view, it would seem better to say that only the 
substance exists,” p. 194. 
5
 Pasnau, p. 184. Here Pasnau is quoting Aquinas, Quodlibet IX.2.2. 
6
 Pasnau, p. 192. This is a partial quote from Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 3.77.1 ad 4. 
7
 Pasnau, p. 187. 
8
 Pasnau, p. 230. 
9
 Pasnau, p. 231n. Pasnau cites the following passage from Aquinas to support his view: “[T]he 
other classes of things are a result of relation rather than a cause of it. For the category when consists in a 
relation to time; and the category where in a relation to place. And posture implies an arrangement of parts; 
and having (attire), the relation of the thing having to the things had” Aquinas, In duodecim libros 
Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1971). 
Translated by John P. Rowan, 1961. 
10
 By ‘reductionist’ I mean the view that although a difference can be made among things, this 
difference does not mark a real distinction in such a way to pick out two distinct things. 
11
 For example, this is Scotus’s conclusion in his Question Commentary on Aristotle’s Metphysics. 
Agreeing perhaps with Pasnau’s interpretation of Aquinas on the categories, Scotus also seems to hold the 
notion that establishing only a rational distinction rather than a real one was not done by accident by 
Aquinas. That is, it is not as if Aquinas thought he was mistaken in providing a real distincton among the 
categories but only managed to conduct his examination within a rationally distinct scope, but that Aquinas 
was intending to divide the categories rationally by dividing them via modes of predication. 
12
 De potentia, q. 7 a. 9 co.: Respondeo. Dicendum quod relatio ad Deum est aliqua res in 
creatura. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut dicit Commentator in XI Metaph., quia relatio est 
debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta, ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. 
Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem 
intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in 
quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit. Secundum ergo hanc 
positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam, sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio 
generis et speciei, et secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim praedicamento 
ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem 
praedicamenta ut patet V Metaph. Si autem relatio non esset in rebus extra animam non poneretur ad 
aliquid unum genus praedicamenti. Et praeterea perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non 
solum attenditur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad 
aliam, sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus, bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat 
philosophus ordinem universi. Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio 
quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum 
ordinatur. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam 
seu passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci. Mensuratur enim 
aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca. Per virtutem etiam activam 
unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero; per substantiam autem et qualitatem 
ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas,- 
vel forma substantialis aut materia,- habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis 
consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et 
numerus, sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum quod aliquid magis vel 
minus altero consideratur: sic enim albius aliquid altero dicitur. Et propter hoc philosophus in V Metaph. 
species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione. 
Sic ergo oportet quod res habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod in eis aliqua 
res sit relatio. Omnes autem creaturae ordinantur ad Deum et sicut ad principium et sicut ad finem, nam 
ordo qui est partium universi ad invicem, est per ordinem qui est totius universi ad Deum; sicut ordo qui 
est inter partes exercitus, est propter ordinem exercitus ad ducem, ut patet XII Metaph. Unde oportet quod 
creaturae realiter referantur ad Deum, et quod ipsa relatio sit res quaedam in creatura. “…Because 
relation is rather weak among all the categories, for this reason, certain men supposed that it was from the 
second things understood (secunda intellecta). For the things first understood are things beyond the soul; 
with respect to cognizing such things, intellect is drawn at first. However, the second things understood are 
called intentions consequent upon the mode of understanding; in this second (hoc secundo), the intellect 
understands itself  in however much it reflects upon itself, understanding itself to understand, and 
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[understanding] the mode by which it understands. According then to this position, it might follow that 
relation is not among things beyond the soul, but in the intellect alone, just like the intention of genus and 
species, and second substances. This, however, cannot be possible. For something is placed in no category 
unless as a thing (res) existing beyond the soul. For a being of reason is divided against being divided by 
the ten categories (Meta. 5).” Special thanks to Sarah Wear for essential translation suggestions for the 
above passage. Another translation continues: “Now if relation had no objective reality, it would not be 
placed among the predicaments. Moreover the perfection and goodness that are in things outside the mind 
are ascribed not only to something absolute and inherent to things but also to the order between one thing 
and another: thus the good of an army consists in the mutual ordering of its parts, to which good the 
Philosopher (Metaph. x) compares the good of the universe. Consequently there must be order in things 
themselves, and this order is a kind of relation. Wherefore there must be relations in things themselves, 
whereby one is ordered to another. Now one thing is ordered to another either as to quantity or as to active 
or passive power: for on these two counts alone can we find in a thin something whereby we compare it 
with another. For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity but also in reference to an extrinsic 
quantity. And again by its active power one thing acts on another, and by its passive power is acted on by 
another: while by its substance and quality a thing is ordered to itself alone and not to another, except 
accidentally: namely inasmuch as a quality, substantial form or matter is a kind of active or passive power, 
and forasmuch as one may ascribe to them a certain kind of quantity: thus one thing produces the same in 
substance; and one thing produces its like in quality; and number or multitude causes dissimilarity and 
diversity in the same things; and dissimilarity in that one thing is considered as being more or less so and so 
than another, thus one thing is said to be whiter than another. Hence the Philosopher (Metaph. v) in giving 
the species of relations, says that some are based on quantity and some on action and passion. Accordingly 
things that are ordered to something must be really related to it, and this relation must be some real thing in 
them. Now all creatures are ordered to God both as to their beginning and as to their end: since the order of 
the parts of the universe to one another results from the order of the whole universe to God: even as the 
mutual order of the parts of an army is on account of the order of the whole army to its commander 
(Metaph. xii). Therefore creatures are really related to God, and this relation is something real in the 
creature.” 
13
 Cite article: Aquinas’s Abstractionism……………… 
14
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 6 l. 4 n. 21: Et alia ratio est, quia utrumque, scilicet ens verum et 
ens per accidens, sunt circa aliquod genus entis, non circa ens simpliciter per se quod est in rebus; et non 
ostendunt aliquam aliam naturam entis existentem extra per se entia. Patet enim quod ens per accidens est 
ex concursu accidentaliter entium extra animam, quorum unumquodque est per se. Sicut grammaticum 
musicum licet sit per accidens, tamen et grammaticum et musicum est per se ens, quia utrumque per se 
acceptum, habet causam determinatam. Et similiter intellectus compositionem et divisionem facit circa res, 
quae sub praedicamentis continentur. “1243. Another reason for excluding them is that, while “both of 
these,” namely, being in the sense of the true and accidental being, (+) belong to some class of being, (~) 
they do not belong to being in the proper sense, which is found in reality. Nor do they designate another 
kind of being distinct from beings in the proper sense. For it is evident that accidental being is a result of 
the coincidental connection of beings which exist outside the mind, each of which is a being of itself. For 
even though the grammatical musical has being only accidentally, nevertheless both grammatical and 
musical are beings in the proper sense, because each of these taken by itself has a definite cause. Similarly 
the intellect combines and separates those things which are contained in the categories.” 
15
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 9 l. 1 n. 1: Postquam determinavit philosophus de ente secundum 
quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, hic intendit determinare de ente secundum quod dividitur per 
potentiam et actum. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima continuat se ad praecedentia, et manifestat suam 
intentionem in hoc libro. In secunda prosequitur quod intendit, ibi, quod quidem igitur. Dicit ergo primo, 
quod in praemissis dictum est de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedicamenta entis referuntur, scilicet 
de substantia. Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia 
alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim 
quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; 
similiter in aliis. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia habent rationem substantiae, quia in 
definitione cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur nasus. 
Et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in principio septimi. “1768. Having established the truth about 
being as divided into the ten categories, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about being as 
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divided into potency and actuality. This is divided into two parts. In the first he links up this discussion 
with the foregoing one, and explains what he intends to do in this book. In the second (1773) he carries out 
his announced plan. He accordingly points out, first, that he has already discussed above the primary kind 
of being to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. And he explains that all 
the other categories are referred to substance as the primary kind of being, because all other beings— 
quantity, quality, and the like—involve the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it is 
the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition of substance; and the same thing 
applies in the case of the other categories. This is evident from the fact that all accidents involve the 
concept of substance, since in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for 
example, in the definition of snub it is necessary to include nose. This was made clear at the beginning of 
Book VII (1347).” 
16
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 1 n. 15: Quod etiam sit prior ordine cognitionis, patet. Illud 
enim est primum secundum cognitionem, quod est magis notum et magis manifestat rem. Res autem 
unaquaeque magis noscitur, quando scitur eius substantia, quam quando scitur eius quantitas aut qualitas. 
Tunc enim putamus nos maxime scire singula, quando noscitur quid est homo aut ignis, magis quam 
quando cognoscimus quale est aut quantum, aut ubi, aut secundum aliquod aliud praedicamentum. Quare 
etiam de ipsis, quae sunt in praedicamentis accidentium, tunc scimus singula, quando de unoquoque scimus 
quid est. Sicut quando scimus quid est ipsum quale, scimus qualitatem, et quando scimus quid est ipsum 
quantum, scimus quantitatem. Sicut enim alia praedicamenta non habent esse nisi per hoc quod insunt 
substantiae, ita non habent cognosci nisi inquantum participant aliquid de modo cognitionis substantiae, 
quae est cognoscere quid est. “1259. (1) It is evident too that substance is first in the order of knowing, for 
that is first in the order of knowing which is better known and explains a thing better. Now each thing is 
better known when its substance is known rather than when its quality or quantity is known; for we think 
we know each thing best when we know what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know of what 
sort it is or how much it is or where it is or when we know it according to any of the other categories. For 
this reason too we think that we know each of the things contained in the categories of accidents when we 
know what each is; for example, when we know what being this sort of thing is, we know quality; and 
when we know what being how much is, we know quantity. For just as the other categories have being only 
insofar as they inhere in a substance, in a similar way they can be known only insofar as they share to some 
extent in the mode according to which substance is known, and this is to know the whatness of a thing.” 
17
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 6: Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera 
secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quiaquoties ens 
dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid 
esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur 
secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, 
idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo 
praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem 
dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis. “890. Being must then be narrowed down to 
diverse genera on the basis of a (+) different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of 
being; for “being is signified,” i.e., something is signified to be, “in just as many ways” (or in as many 
senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are 
calledpredicaments, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, 
since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there 
must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man 
is an animal, is signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, is signifies quality; and so on.” 
18
 Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 34 n. 9: Circa primum, primo resumit quod de unoquoque 
possunt aliqua praedicari, quidquid significent: sive sit quale, sive quantum, vel quodcunque aliud genus 
accidentis, vel etiam quae intrant substantiam rei, quae sunt essentialia praedicata. Secundo, resumit quod 
haec, scilicet substantialia praedicata, sunt finita. Tertio, resumit quod genera praedicamentorum sunt 
finita; scilicet quale et quantum et cetera. Si enim aliquis dicat quod quantitas praedicetur de substantia, et 
qualitas de quantitate, et sic in infinitum; hoc excludit per hoc, quod genera praedicamentorum sunt finita. 
Quarto, resumit quod, sicut supra expositum est, unum de uno praedicatur in simplici praedicatione. Et hoc 
ideo inducit, quia posset aliquis dicere quod primo praedicabitur unum de uno, puta de homine animal; et 
ista praedicatio multiplicabitur quousque poterit inveniri aliquod unum, quod de homine praedicetur. 
Quibus finitis, praedicabuntur duo de uno: puta, dicetur quod homo est animal album; et sic multo plura 
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praedicata invenirentur secundum diversas combinationes praedicatorum. Rursus, praedicabuntur tria de 
uno: puta, dicetur quod homo est animal album magnum; et sic semper addendo ad numerum, magis 
multiplicabuntur praedicata, et erit procedere in infinitum in praedicatis, sicut etiam in additione 
numerorum. Sed hoc excludit per praedicationem unius de uno. Quinto, resumit ut non dicamus aliqua 
simpliciter praedicari de ipsis, quae non aliquid sunt, idest de accidentibus, quorum nullum est aliquid 
subsistens. De accidente enim neque subiectum neque accidens proprie praedicatur, ut supra dictum est. 
Omnia enim huiusmodi, quae non sunt aliquid substantiale, sunt accidentia, et de his nihil praedicatur 
simpliciter loquendo: sed haec quidem praedicantur per se, scilicet de subiectis, vel substantialia 
praedicata vel accidentalia. Illa vero secundum alium modum, idest per accidens, scilicet cum 
praedicantur de accidentibus, aut subiecta, aut accidentia. Haec enim omnia, scilicet accidentia, habent de 
sui ratione quod dicantur de subiecto: illud autem quod est accidens, non est subiectum aliquod; unde nihil 
proprie loquendo potest de eo praedicari, quia nihil talium, scilicet accidentium, ponimus esse tale, quod 
dicatur id, quod dicitur, idest quod suscipiat praedicationem eius, quod de eo praedicatur, non quasi 
aliquid alterum existens, sicut accidit in substantiis. Homo enim dicitur animal vel album, non quia aliquid 
aliud sit animal vel album, sed quia ipsummet quod est homo, est animal vel album: sed album ideo dicitur 
homo vel musicum, quia aliquid alterum, scilicet subiectum albi, est homo vel musicum. Sed ipsum 
accidens inest aliis; et alia, quae praedicantur de accidente, praedicantur de altero, idest de subiecto 
accidentis; et propter hoc praedicantur de accidente, ut dictum est. Hoc autem introduxit, quia si accidens 
praedicatur de subiecto, et e converso, et omnia quae accidunt subiecto, praedicentur de se invicem, 
sequetur quod praedicatio procedat in infinitum, quia uni infinita accidunt. “Thirdly, he reaffirms that the 
genera of predicaments are finite, namely, quality, quantity and so on. For if someone were to say that 
quantity is predicated of substance, and quality of quantity, and so on to infinity, he excludes this on the 
ground that the genera of predicaments are finite.” 
19
 Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 26 n. 7: Deinde cum dicit: quod autem contingit etc., manifestat 
quod supposuerat, scilicet quod, altero extremorum existente in aliquo toto, alterum non sit in eodem, 
dicens quod manifestum est ex coordinationibus, scilicet praedicamentorum diversorum, quae non 
commutantur ad invicem. Scilicet quia id quod est in uno praedicamento, non est in altero, manifestum est 
quod contingat b non esse in toto, in quo est a, aut e converso, quia videlicet contingit unum terminorum 
accipi in uno praedicamento, in quo non est alius. Sit enim una coordinatio praedicamenti acd, puta 
praedicamentum substantiae; et alia coordinatio sit bef, puta praedicamentum quantitatis. Si ergo nihil 
eorum, quae sunt in coordinatione acd, de nullo praedicatur eorum, quae sunt in coordinatione bef; a 
autem sit in p, quasi in quodam generalissimo, quod sit principium totius primae coordinationis; 
manifestum est quod b non erit in p, quia sic coordinationes, idest praedicamenta, commutarentur. 
Similiter autem est si b sit in quodam toto, ut puta in e; manifestum est quod a non erit in e. “Then (79b5) 
he explains something he had presupposed, namely, “on condition that one of the extremes exist in some 
whole and that the other be not in the same,” saying that it is “clear from the ‘orderings’ of the various 
predicaments, which are” not mutually interchangeable. In other words, because that which is in one 
predicament is not in another, it is plain that B happens not to be in the whole in which A is, or vice versa, 
because one of the terms happens to be taken from one predicament in which the other is not found. Thus, 
let one ordering of the predicaments be ACD, say the predicament of substance, and another ordering be 
BEF, say the predicament of quantity. Then if none of those in the ordering ACD be predicated of none in 
the ordering BEF, while A is in P as in that most general item which is the principle of the whole first 
ering, it is plain that B is not in P, because then the orderings, i.e., the predicaments, would be 
interchanged. Similarly, if B is in some whole, say in E, it is plain that A is not in E.” 
20 Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 33 n. 6: Deinde cum dicit: quare autem in quod etc. ostendit 
differentiam praedicatorum per se ad invicem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, distinguit praedicata ad 
invicem secundum diversa genera; secundo, ostendit differentiam praedicatorum; ibi: amplius substantiam 
quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nos praedicari dicimus solum illud, quod praedicatur non 
secundum aliud subiectum, hoc autem diversificatur secundum decem praedicamenta; sequitur quod omne 
quod sic praedicatur, praedicetur aut in quod quid est, idest per modum substantialis praedicati, aut per 
modum qualis, vel quanti, vel alicuius alterius praedicamentorum, de quibus actum est in praedicamentis. 
Et addit cum unum de uno praedicetur: quia si praedicatum non sit unum sed multa, non poterit 
praedicatum simpliciter dici quid vel quale; sed forte dicetur simul quale quid, puta si dicam, homo est 
animal album. Fuit autem necessaria haec additio; quia si multa praedicentur de uno, ita quod multa 
accipiantur in ratione unius praedicati, poterunt in infinitum praedicationes multiplicari, secundum 
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infinitos modos combinandi praedicata ad invicem. Unde cum quaeritur status in his quae praedicantur, 
necesse est accipere unum de uno praedicari. 
21
 Paul Symington, On Determining What There Is (New Brunswick: Ontos, 2010). 
22
 John Duns Scotus, ………… 
23
 Pasnau, p. 226. 
24
 ST Iª q. 48 a. 2 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in V Metaphys., ens dupliciter 
dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem praedicamenta, et sic 
convertitur cum re. Et hoc modo, nulla privatio est ens, unde nec malum. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod 
significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum est, et hoc est 
ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est. Et sic caecitatem dicimus esse in oculo, vel quamcumque 
aliam privationem. Et hoc modo etiam malum dicitur ens. Propter huius autem distinctionis ignorantiam, 
aliqui, considerantes quod aliquae res dicuntur malae, vel quod malum dicitur esse in rebus, crediderunt 
quod malum esset res quaedam. “As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one 
way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that 
sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In 
another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a 
copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" 
and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be 
called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil 
is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.” 
25
 De veritate, 1.1. 
26
 De potentia, q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2: Sed dicitur, quod significat simul essentiam et notionem. Sed 
contra, in divinis, secundum Boetium, sunt haec duo praedicamenta; substantia, ad quam pertinet essentia; 
et ad aliquid, ad quod pertinent notionalia. Non potest autem aliquid esse in duobus praedicamentis, quia 
homo albus non est aliquid unum nisi per accidens, ut habetur V Metaph. Ergo potentia generandi non 
potest in sua ratione utrumque complecti, scilicet substantiam et notionem. “Should it be said that it 
denotes both the essence and a notion,—on the contrary, according to Boethius (De Trin.) there are two 
predicaments in God, substance to which the essence belongs, and relation to which the notional acts 
belong. But a thing cannot be in two predicaments, since a white man is not one thing save accidentally 
(Metaph. v, 7). Therefore the generative power cannot include both, substance namely and notional act.” 
Also, De potentia, q. 2 a. 2 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum, quod in rebus creatis unum praedicamentum 
accidit alteri, propter quod non potest ex duobus fieri unum, nisi unum per accidens; sed in divinis relatio 
est realiter ipsa essentia: et ideo non est simile. “Among creatures one predicament is accidental to 
another, wherefore one thing cannot result from two, except what is one accidentally; whereas in God 
relation is in reality the very essence; and thus there is no comparison.” 
27
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 4 n. 2: Quod enim aliquo modo, idest secundum quid aliis 
conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in singulis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem 
factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus 
quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum, in quibus est quod quid est. “1332. For the 
fact that it belongs to the others “in another sense,” i.e., in a qualified sense, is clear from the fact that in 
each of the other categories some reply may be made to the question “What is it?” For we ask of what sort 
a thing is, or what its quality is, as “What is whiteness?” And we answer, “Color.” Hence it is evident that 
quality is one of the many things in which whatness is found.” 
28 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 10: Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, 
quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc 
quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc 
autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, inquantum significat albedinem per modum 
accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est 
inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. 
Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata 
accidentalia non ponerentur a philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc 
totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est. “894. And there is no truth in 
Avicenna’s statement that predicates which belong to the class of accidents primarily signify substance and 
secondarily accidents, as the terms white and musical. For the term white, as it is used in the categories, 
signifies quality alone. Now the term white implies a subject inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the 
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manner of an accident, so that it must by implication include the subject in its notion, because the being of 
an accident consists in being in something. For even though whiteness signifies an accident, it still does not 
signify this after the manner of an accident but after that of a substance. Hence it implies a subject in no 
way. For if it were to signify a subject primarily, then the Philosopher would not put accidental predicates 
under essential being but under accidental being. For the whole statement “the man is white” is a being in 
an accidental sense, as has been stated (886).” 
29
 Met. 7.4 1352: “Hence “in one sense,” i.e., primarily and without qualification, only substance 
will have a definition, and only substance will have an essence. “And in another sense,” i.e., secondarily 
and with some qualification, the other categories will also have a definition. For substance, which has a 
quiddity in the absolute sense, does not depend on something else so far as its quiddity is concerned. An 
accident depends on its subject, however, although a subject does not belong to the essence of its accident 
(in much the same way as a creature depends on the creator, yet the creator does not belong to the essence 
of the creature), so that an extrinsic essence must be placed in its definition. In fact, accidents have being 
only by reason of the fact that they inhere in a subject, and therefore their quiddity depends on their subject. 
Hence a subject must be given in the definition of an accident at one time directly and at another, 
indirectly.” 
30
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 9 l. 1 n. 1: Postquam determinavit philosophus de ente secundum 
quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, hic intendit determinare de ente secundum quod dividitur per 
potentiam et actum. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima continuat se ad praecedentia, et manifestat suam 
intentionem in hoc libro. In secunda prosequitur quod intendit, ibi, quod quidem igitur. Dicit ergo primo, 
quod in praemissis dictum est de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedicamenta entis referuntur, scilicet 
de substantia. Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia 
alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim 
quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; 
similiter in aliis. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia habent rationem substantiae, quia in 
definitione cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur nasus. 
Et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in principio septimi. “1768. Having established the truth about 
being as divided into the ten categories, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about being as 
divided into potency and actuality. This is divided into two parts. In the first he links up this discussion 
with the foregoing one, and explains what he intends to do in this book. In the second (1773) he carries out 
his announced plan. He accordingly points out, first, that he has already discussed above the primary kind 
of being to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. And he explains that all 
the other categories are referred to substance as the primary kind of being, because all other beings— 
quantity, quality, and the like—involve the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it is 
the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition of substance; and the same thing 
applies in the case of the other categories. This is evident from the fact that all accidents involve the 
concept of substance, since in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for 
example, in the definition of snub it is necessary to include nose. This was made clear at the beginning of 
Book VII (1347).” 
31
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 4 n. 1: Hic ponit secundam solutionem propositae quaestionis: 
et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit solutionem. Secundo probat eam, ibi, illud autem palam, et cetera. 
Tertio removet quasdam dubitationes, quae possent ex praedictis oriri, ibi, habet autem dubitationem. 
Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo definitio et quod quid est invenitur in substantia et 
accidentibus. Secundo quomodo de utrisque praedicetur, ibi, oportet quidem igitur intendere. Dicit ergo 
primo, quod dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non sit 
accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur 
multipliciter sicut et quod quid est. Ipsum enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc 
aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia 
huiusmodi talia. Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum 
de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit 
substantiae, aliis autem alio modo, idest secundum quid. “1331. Here he gives the second solution to the 
question which was raised; and in regard to this he does three things. First (582:C 1331), he gives the 
solution. Second (584:C 1339), he proves it (“Now it is evident”). Third (585:C 1342), he dispels certain 
difficulties which could arise from the previous discussion (“Now if one denies”). He accordingly says, 
first (582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution (581:C 1325) that there is no 
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definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to another solution it is necessary 
to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies 
substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies each of the other categories, such as 
quantity, quality and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other categories, although 
not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, similar fashion whatness 
belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, “but in another sense to the other categories,” i.e., in a 
qualified sense.” 
32
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 1: Hic philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur ens. Et 
circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens in ens per se et per accidens. Secundo distinguit modos entis per 
accidens, ibi, secundum accidens quidem et cetera. Tertio modos entis per se, ibi, secundum se vero. Dicit 
ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod 
illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc 
patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de 
genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis 
considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens 
secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae 
quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est 
albus, est ens per accidens. Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur 
secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et 
accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens. “He says, 
then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division 
of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the 
fact that he later divides essential being into the ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the class of 
accident (889). Hence being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute 
sense; for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental 
being, in the sense in which it is taken here must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; 
and this comparison is signified by the term is when, for example, it is said that the man is white. Hence 
this whole “the man is white” is an accidental being. It is clear, then, that the division of being into essential 
being and accidental being is based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either essentially or 
accidentally. But the division of being into substance and accident is based on the fact that a thing is in its 
own nature either a substance or an accident.” 
33
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 5: Deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguit modum entis 
per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod 
est ens perfectum. Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius 
autem et esse significat. Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam 
ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum, ibi, amplius esse 
significat et ens. Dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras 
praedicationis. Sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut 
genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra 
essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam 
speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio 
huius probavit philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest. “Here he distinguishes between the types of 
essential being; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides the kind of being which lies 
outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments. Second (895), he gives another type of 
being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind (“Again, being, signifies”). Third (897), he divides being 
by potentiality and actuality— and being divided in this way is more common than complete being, for 
potential being is being only imperfectly and in a qualified sense (“Again, to be”).” 
34
 Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, 5.9. 
35
 Contra Gentiles, lib. 4 cap. 14 n. 12: Quamvis autem in Deo ponatur esse relatio, non tamen 
sequitur quod in Deo sit aliquid habens esse dependens. In nobis enim relationes habent esse dependens, 
quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae: unde habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam 
rationem, sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit. Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam 
substantiae superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae; oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum 
supra esse substantiae, et ab ipso dependens; et tanto uniuscuiusque eorum esse est prius vel posterius, 
quanto forma accidentalis, secundum propriam rationem, fuerit propinquior substantiae vel magis 
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perfecta. Propter quod et relatio realiter substantiae adveniens et postremum et imperfectissimum esse 
habet: postremum quidem, quia non solum praeexigit esse substantiae, sed etiam esse aliorum accidentium, 
ex quibus causatur relatio, sicut unum in quantitate causat aequalitatem, et unum in qualitate 
similitudinem; imperfectissimum autem, quia propria relationis ratio consistit in eo quod est ad alterum, 
unde esse eius proprium, quod substantiae superaddit, non solum dependet ab esse substantiae, sed etiam 
ab esse alicuius exterioris. Haec autem in divinis locum non habent: quia non est in Deo aliquod aliud esse 
quam substantiae; quicquid enim in Deo est, substantia est. Sicut igitur esse sapientiae in Deo non est esse 
dependens a substantia, quia esse sapientiae est esse substantiae; ita nec esse relationis est esse dependens 
neque a substantia, neque ab alio exteriori, quia etiam esse relationis est esse substantiae. Non igitur per 
hoc quod relatio in Deo ponitur, sequitur quod sit in eo aliquod esse dependens; sed solum quod in Deo sit 
respectus aliquis, in quo ratio relationis consistit; sicut ex hoc quod sapientia in Deo ponitur, non sequitur 
quod sit in eo aliquid accidentale, sed solum perfectio quaedam in qua ratio sapientiae consistit. Per quod 
etiam patet quod ex imperfectione quae in relationibus creatis esse videtur, non sequitur quod personae 
divinae sint imperfectae, quae relationibus distinguuntur: sed sequitur quod divinarum personarum minima 
sit distinctio. “Although, of course, one holds that there is a relation in God, it does not, for all that, follow 
that there is in God something which has a dependent being, for in us the relations have a dependent being 
because their being is other than the being of the substance. Hence, they have a proper mode of being in 
their proper essence, just as happens in the case of the other accidents. In view of the fact that all accidents 
are forms of a sort superadded to the substance and caused by the principles of the substance, it must be 
that their being is superadded to the being of the substance and dependent on that being. And by as much as 
the being of each and every one of them is prior or posterior, by that much the accidental form in its proper 
essence will be more like a substance or more perfect. For this reason even a relation really accruing to a 
substance has a being which is last in order and quite imperfect: last in order, that is, because not only is the 
being of the substance prerequisite, but also the being of other accidents, out of which the relation is caused 
(thus to be one in quantity causes equality, and one in quality similarity); quite imperfect in turn, because 
the proper essence of the relation consists in its being toward-another-hence, its proper being, which it adds 
to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but on the being of some exterior thing as 
well. This situation, of course, has no place in divinity, since there is in God no other being than that of 
substance, for whatever is in God is substance. Just as the being of wisdom in God, therefore, is not being 
by depending on substance (since the being of wisdom is the being of substance), so the being of relation is 
not being by depending either on substance or on another exterior thing (since the being of relation is also 
the being of substance). From the fact, then, that one puts a relation in God it does not follow that there is in 
Him some dependent being, but only that there is in Him some aspect in which aspect the essence of 
relation consists. just so from the fact that one puts wisdom in God it does not follow that there is 
something accidental in Him, but only that there is a certain perfection in which the essence of wisdom 
consists.” 
36
 “And because quiddity in these substances is not the same as existence, they are orderable 
within a predicament. And this is why they have a genus, a species, and a difference, although their proper 
differences are hidden from us. For even in the case of sensible things, the essential differences themselves 
are not known; whence they are signified through accidental differences which rise out of the essential 
ones, as a cause is signified through its effect; this is what is done when biped, for example, is given as the 
difference of man. But the proper accidents of immaterial substances are unknown to us; whence their 
differences cannot be signified by us either through themselves or through accidental differences.” 
37
 ST Iª q. 88 a. 2 ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere 
quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et 
materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in 
praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse. Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus 
materialibus neque secundum genus naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in 
genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci 
de Angelis secundum rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo autem nullo 
modo. “Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do 
not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial 
substances are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God 
has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in 
no genus, as stated above (Question [3], Article [5]). Hence through the likeness derived from material 
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things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though 
not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.” 
38
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 5 l. 22 n. 9: Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno 
praedicamento, et sunt unum genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genere primo modo. Sicut 
corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores, et sapores. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus 
consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus 
consideratur a logico, quia est rationis. “1127. Now it is clear, from what has been said, that some things 
are contained under one category and are in one genus in this second sense, although they are diverse in 
genus in the first sense. Examples of this are the celestial bodies and elemental bodies, and colors and 
flavors. The first way in which things are diverse in genus is considered rather by the natural scientist and 
also by the philosopher, because it is more real. But the second way in which things are diverse in genus is 
considered by the logician, because it is conceptual.” 
39
 In De generatione, lib. 1 l. 6 n. 6: Secundo ibi: si quidem primum etc., ostendit quod secundum 
utrumque sensum sequitur inconveniens. Si enim simpliciter dicatur primum ens quod est substantia, ergo 
et simpliciter non ens dicetur non substantia. Si ergo generatio simplex hoc requirit, quod sit simpliciter 
entis ex simpliciter non ente, sequetur quod erit substantia ex non substantia. Sed quando ponitur non esse 
substantiam neque hoc (quod est demonstrativum individualis substantiae), manifestum est quod nullum 
aliorum praedicamentorum remanebit, idest neque quale neque quantum neque ubi: quia sequeretur 
quod passiones, idest accidentia, separarentur a substantiis, quod est impossibile. Si autem dicatur quod 
illud ex quo aliquid generatur simpliciter, sit non ens universaliter, prout ens simpliciter dicitur ens 
commune, sequetur quod per hoc quod dicitur non ens, intelligatur universaliter negatio omnium entium. 
Unde sequetur quod illud quod generatur simpliciter, generetur penitus ex nihilo: quod est contra rationem 
naturalis generationis, et contra sententias omnium philosophorum naturalium, qui scilicet de generatione 
naturali locuti sunt. “47. Secondly [47], he shows that according to both senses something inadmissible 
follows. For if "absolute being" is taken to mean the first being, which is substance, then "absolute non-
being" will be non-substance. If, therefore, absolute generation requires that there be absolute being from 
absolute nonbeing, it will follow that there will be substance from non-substance. But when it is assumed 
that neither substance exists nor a "this" (which implies an individual substance), then it is plain that none 
of the other predicaments will remain, i.e., neither quality, nor quantity, nor "where" — because otherwise 
it would follow that "passions," i.e., accidents, would exist separated from substances, which is 
impossible.” 
40
 De veritate, q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3: Sed dicebat, quod addit respectum ad finem.- Sed contra: 
secundum hoc enim bonum nihil aliud esset quam ens relatum. Sed ens relatum concernit determinatum 
genus entis, quod est ad aliquid. Ergo bonum est in aliquo uno praedicamento determinato; quod est 
contra philosophum in I Ethic., ubi ponit bonum in omnibus generibus. “The answer was given that it adds 
a relation to an end.—On the contrary, in this case good would be nothing but related being. But related 
being pertains to a definite category of being, which is called itrelation” or “to something.” Good would 
therefore be in a definite category. But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says, placing good in all the 
categories.” 
41
 Super De Trinitate, pars 2 q. 4 a. 2 arg. 6: Praeterea, posterius numquam est causa prioris. Sed inter 
omnia accidentia primum locum tenet quantitas, ut dicit Boethius in commento praedicamentorum. Inter 
quantitates autem naturaliter numerus prior est, cum sit simplicior et magis abstractus. Ergo impossibile 
est quod aliquod aliud accidens sit principium pluralitatis secundum numerum. “6. What is posterior is 
never the cause of what is prior. But among all accidents, quantity holds first place, as Boethius says in Lib. 
praedicam. Among quantities, however, number is prior since it is more simple and more abstract. 
Therefore an accident cannot be the principle of plurality according to number.” 
42
 ST Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 2 co.: Respondeo dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter 
quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem specierum differentias sic 
assignat Simplicius, in commento praedicamentorum, dicens quod qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales, 
quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, 
et possunt amitti. Et haec quidem, quae sunt adventitiae, sunt habitus et dispositiones, secundum facile et 
difficile amissibile differentes. Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid est in 
potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel 
in profundum, vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia species qualitatis, 
secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati. Sed 
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ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconveniens videtur. Sunt enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles 
non naturales, sed adventitiae, et multae dispositiones non adventitiae, sed naturales, sicut sanitas et 
pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea hoc non convenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius 
est, prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. 
Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super 
Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam 
mensuram. Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale 
dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti 
secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per 
philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest 
accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur 
principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel 
determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum 
sui rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet 
quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum 
actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur 
quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in 
his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum 
autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam 
rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in VII 
Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; 
dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et 
cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et 
etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V 
Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel 
male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male. 
Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non convenit, 
tunc habet rationem mali. Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima 
species qualitatis. “Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from 
other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as 
Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a certain 
determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material 
potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference 
affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its 
accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the 
Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19). Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be 
taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural 
principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or determination 
of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, 
considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not 
concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly 
transitory. But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the 
second and third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done 
with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything 
pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, 
whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. On the other hand, the mode or determination of the 
subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is habit and 
disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the 
body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in 
accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why 
a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also 
changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and 
movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is 
disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the 
passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is 
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unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for this 
reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.” 
43
 In Physic., lib. 3 l. 5 n. 15: Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem 
praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem 
essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc 
esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta. Tripliciter autem fit omnis 
praedicatio. Unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam 
eius, ut cum dico Socrates est homo, vel homo est animal; et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum 
substantiae. Alius autem modus est quo praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen 
inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum 
quantitatis (nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: unde et Plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); 
aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum qualitatis (unde et qualitates fundantur super 
quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad 
alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis (cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur de homine 
aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum). Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, 
quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et 
accidentia extrinseca de substantiis praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod 
homo sit albus. Denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur quidem quodammodo communiter in 
omnibus, et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad homines pertinent tantum. Communiter autem invenitur 
aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; 
denominatur enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori. Cum autem quatuor sint genera 
causarum, duo ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et forma: unde praedicatio quae posset fieri 
secundum haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis, 
et homo est corporeus. Causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis 
habet rationem causae, inquantum movet agentem. Remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest 
denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. Sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est 
praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem 
quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab 
agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est. Mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca. 
Intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo uniuscuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: ab his ergo 
denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrinseco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis. 
Exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a tempore, est 
praedicamentum quando; secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est praedicamentum ubi et situs, 
quod addit supra ubi ordinem partium in loco. Hoc autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte temporis, 
cum ordo partium in tempore in ratione temporis importetur: est enim tempus numerus motus secundum 
prius et posterius. Sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse quando vel ubi per denominationem a tempore vel a loco. 
Est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad 
conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, 
ungulas vel aliquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel 
vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. 
Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel 
pedatus. Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati 
complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini inquantum habet 
rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accommodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium 
inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde 
cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet 
rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur habitus. Sed 
attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua 
natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel 
sellatum seu armatum. “322. To settle this matter it must be remembered that being is divided into the ten 
predicaments not univocally, as a genus into its species, but according to the diverse manner of existing. 
Now the modes of existing are parallel to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of 
something, we say that this is that; that is why the ten genera of being are called “predicaments.” Now 
every predication takes place in one of three ways. One way is to predicate of a subject that which pertains 
to its essence, as when I say “Socrates is man” or “Man is animal.” According to this the predicament of 
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“substance” is taken. Another way is to predicate of a subject something that is not of its essence but yet 
inheres in the subject, This inherent thing may be traceable to the matter in the subject, in which case one 
has the predicament of “quantity” (for quantity is properly a result of matter; for which reason Plato traced 
the “large” to matter); or it is traceable to the form and in this case, there is the predicament of “quality” 
(for which reason qualities are founded on quality, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in a plane); or 
the predication may be due to a relation existing between subject and something else and thus we have the 
predicament of “relation”, (for when I say, “The man is a father,” it is not something absolute that is 
predicated of the man but a relation in him to something without). The third mode of predicating is when 
something outside the subject is predicated after the manner of denomination; this allows even extrinsic 
accidents to be predicated of substance; but yet we do not say that man is whiteness but that man is white. 
To be denominated by something extrinsic can occur, generally speaking, to all things in one way or 
another, and in a special way in those matters that refer only to man. Speaking generally, a thing can be 
denominated by something extrinsic either according to the notion of cause or according to that of measure. 
For something is denominated “caused” or “measured” on account of its relationship to something 
extrinsic. Now there are four genera of causes, two of which are parts of the essence, namely, matter and 
form; hence any predication based on these two pertains to the predicament of “substance,” as when I say 
that man is rational and man is corporeal. In regard to the other two causes, the final cause does not cause 
separately from the agent; for the end is a cause only insofar as it influences the agent. Therefore, the only 
cause according to which a thing can be denominated something as based on something extrinsic is the 
agent cause. Consequently, when something is denominated from the agent cause, it is the predicament of 
“passion,” for to undergo (pati) is nothing but the undergoing of something from an agent; on the other 
hand, if the agent cause is denominated something on account of its effect, one has the predicament of 
“action,” for action is an act from the agent into something else, as stated above (no, 316). In regard to 
measures, it will be either intrinsic or extrinsic. An intrinsic measure would be a thing’s own length and 
width and depth: in these cases a subject is being denominated something by reason of what inheres 
intrinsically; hence this Pertains to the predicament quantity. The extrinsic measures are time and place. It 
is the predicament “when”, whenever something is denominated by time; when it is denominated by place, 
it is the predicament “where” or the predicament “situs”, which adds to “where” the order of the parts in 
place. Such an order of parts is not considered in regard to the measure which is time, for the order of parts 
in time in time is already implied in the notion of time; for time is the number of motion according to the 
order of the “before” and the “after” [its parts]. Thus it is through denomination from time or place that 
something is said to be “when” or “where”. There is a special predicament for men. For in other animals 
nature provided the requirements for preserving life, such as horns for defense, a tough and wooly hide as a 
covering, claws or the like for proceeding without harm. Hence, when by reason of this equipment animals 
are said to be “armed” or “covered” or “shod,” they are somehow so called not by reason of something; 
extrinsic but of something intrinsic, which is part of them. Hence, such are referred to the predicament of 
“substance,” as the same would be if man were said to be “endowed with hands” or “feet.” But the other 
things could not be endowed upon man by nature, both because they would be out of keeping with the 
subtlety of his complexion and because reason makes man capable of an enormous number of works for the 
performance of which nature could not have endowed him with specific instruments. In the place of all 
these instruments man has reason, which he can use to make for himself the things that are intrinsic to other 
animals. So when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated thus by reason of 
something extrinsic to him that is neither a cause nor a measure; hence it is located in a special predicament 
called “habitus.” But we should not fail to note that this predicament is in certain matters used also for 
other animals not inasmuch as they are considered in their nature but insofar as they are put at the service 
of man: thus we that a horse is caparisoned or saddled or armed.” 
44
 De ente et essentia, 5. Et hoc ideo est, quia non habent per se esse, absolutum a subiecto, sed 
sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale, quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto 
relinquitur esse accidentale, quando accidens subiecto advenit. 
45
 De ente et essentia 5. Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest 
in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut genus 
primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de 
decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas 
secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum philosophum IX metaphysicae. 
Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia propriae 
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passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco 
differentiae, si in abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas 
est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur. 
Sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum 
substantiarum compositarum, in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est 
nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium 
relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit philosophus relationem in V 
metaphysicae. Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque 
sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur 
differentiae coloris, quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae species colorum 
causantur. 
46
 De ente, 5. 
47
 Aquinas derives the distinct modes of being of each of the ten categories in his Commentary on 
the Metaphysics 5.9. I am giving the more generic notion of a mode of being as “to be in” 
48
 Commenary on Metaphysics: “1353. Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an 
accident when an accident is signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that 
snubness is a concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus in order to signify that 
accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is signified in the abstract, after the manner of a 
substance, then the subject is given in its definition indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is 
the concavity of a nose. 1354. Hence it is clear that when I say snub nose, it is not necessary to understand 
concave nose in place of nose; because nose is not included in the definition of snub as though it were part 
of its essence, but as something added to its essence. Hence snub and concave are essentially the same. But 
snub adds over and above concave a relation to a determinate subject; and thus in this determinate subject, 
nose, snub differs in no way from concave, nor is it necessary that any word should be put in place of snub 
except the word concave. Thus it will not be necessary to use concave nose in place of snub, but only 
concave.” 
49
 ST Iª q. 28 a. 2 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verba illa Augustini non pertinent ad hoc, 
quod paternitas, vel alia relatio quae est in Deo, secundum esse suum non sit idem quod divina essentia; 
sed quod non praedicatur secundum modum substantiae, ut existens in eo de quo dicitur, sed ut ad alterum 
se habens. Et propter hoc dicuntur duo tantum esse praedicamenta in divinis. Quia alia praedicamenta 
important habitudinem ad id de quo dicuntur, tam secundum suum esse, quam secundum proprii generis 
rationem, nihil autem quod est in Deo, potest habere habitudinem ad id in quo est, vel de quo dicitur, nisi 
habitudinem identitatis, propter summam Dei simplicitatem. “These words of Augustine do not imply that 
paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but 
that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a 
relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitude to 
that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in 
God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; 
and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.” 
50 ST IIIª q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3: Praeterea, corpus Christi semper veram retinet corporis naturam, nec 
unquam mutatur in spiritum. Sed de ratione corporis est ut sit quantitas positionem habens, ut patet in 
praedicamentis. Sed ad rationem huius quantitatis pertinet quod diversae partes in diversis partibus loci 
existant. Non ergo potest esse, ut videtur, quod totus Christus sit sub qualibet parte specierum. “Further, 
Christ's body always retains the true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the 
nature of a body for it to be "quantity having position" (Predic. iv). But it belongs to the nature of this 
quantity that the various parts exist in various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the 
entire Christ to be under every part of the species.” 
51
 ST Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co.: Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est 
sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel 
quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in 
seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur 
respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post 
praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius 
et posterius, et alia huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt 
in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel 
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quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola 
relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, 
non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans 
vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod habitus dicitur 
tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his 
constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in 
V Metaphys., quod inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius. Si autem 
sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se 
habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in 
V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et 
aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde 
dicendum est quod habitus est qualitas. “I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from 
"habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any 
other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se 
habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. Concerning the first, we must observe that 
"to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And so the 
Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various 
predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are 
had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" 
and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. 
Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a 
companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or 
passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or 
covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that 
"a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in 
those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which 
are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that 
"there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed." But if "to have" be taken according as a 
thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of 
having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a 
disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in 
regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say 
that habit is a quality.” 
52
 In Physic., lib. 5 l. 3 n. 3: Deinde cum dicit: secundum substantiam autem etc., manifestat 
conditionalem praemissam. Et primo ostendit quod in aliis generibus a tribus praedictis, non potest esse 
motus; secundo ostendit quomodo in istis tribus generibus motus sit, ibi: quoniam autem neque substantiae 
et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod in genere substantiae non est motus; secundo quod 
nec in genere ad aliquid, ibi: neque est in ad aliquid etc.; tertio quod nec in genere actionis et passionis, 
ibi: neque agentis neque patientis et cetera. Praetermittit autem tria praedicamenta, 
scilicet quando et situm et habere. Quando enim significat in tempore esse; tempus autem mensura motus 
est: unde per quam rationem non est motus in actione et passione, quae pertinent ad motum, eadem ratione 
nec in quando. Situs autem ordinem quendam partium demonstrat; ordo vero relatio est: et 
similiter habere dicitur secundum quandam habitudinem corporis ad id quod ei adiacet: unde in his non 
potest esse motus, sicut nec in relatione. Quod ergo motus non sit in genere substantiae, sic probat. Omnis 
motus est inter contraria, sicut supra dictum est: sed substantiae nihil est contrarium: ergo secundum 
substantiam non est motus. “He passes over the three predicaments of when, situs and habitus. 
For when expresses existence in time, which is the measure of motion, Hence for the same reason that there 
is no motion in action and passion which pertain to motion, there is no motion in when. Situs denotes order 
of parts, and order is a relation; in like manner, habitus bespeaks a relationship existing between a body and 
what is adjacent to it. Hence there can be no motion in situs and habitus any more than in relation. 
That motion (487) is not found in the genus of substance he proves by saying that every motion is between 
contraries, as we have said; but nothing is contrary to substance. Therefore, there is no motion in respect of 
substance.” 
53
 ST Iª-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3: Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat 
ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet 
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aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in 
commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit 
secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit 
secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, 
sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae 
dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete. “Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that 
which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 
25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in 
his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to 
place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 
'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at 
perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes 
perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue.” 
54
 De ente, 5. 
55
 In Physic., lib. 4 l. 7 n. 4: Unde Alexander dixit quod ultima sphaera nullo modo est in loco: non 
enim omne corpus de necessitate est in loco, cum locus non cadat in definitione corporis. Et propter hoc 
dixit quod ultima sphaera non movetur in loco, neque secundum totum, neque secundum partes. Sed quia 
oportet omnem motum in aliquo genere motus poni, Avicenna eum secutus, dixit quod motus ultimae 
sphaerae non est motus in loco, sed motus in situ, contra Aristotelem, qui dicit in quinto huius, quod motus 
est tantum in tribus generibus, scilicet in quantitate, qualitate et ubi. Sed hoc non potest stare: impossibile 
est enim quod motus sit per se loquendo in aliquo genere cuius specierum ratio in indivisibili consistit. 
Propter hoc enim in substantia non est motus, quia ratio cuiuslibet speciei substantiae consistit in 
indivisibili, eo quod species substantiae non dicuntur secundum magis et minus: et propter hoc, cum motus 
habeat successionem, non producitur in esse forma substantialis per motum, sed per generationem, quae 
est terminus motus. Secus autem est de albedine et similibus, quae participantur secundum magis et minus. 
Quaelibet autem species situs habet rationem in indivisibili consistentem; ita quod si aliquid additur vel 
minuitur, non est eadem species situs. Unde impossibile est quod in genere situs sit motus. Et praeterea, 
remanet eadem difficultas. Nam situs, secundum quod ponitur praedicamentum, importat ordinem partium 
in loco: licet secundum quod ponitur differentia quantitatis, non importet nisi ordinem partium in toto. 
Omne igitur quod movetur secundum situm, oportet quod moveatur secundum locum. “475. Wherefore 
Alexander said that the outermost orb is not in place at all: for it is not necessary for every body to be in 
place, since place is not in the definition of body. For this reason he held that the outermost sphere is not in 
motion in place, neither as a whole, nor as to its parts. But since every motion must fit into one of the 
genera of motion, Avicenna, following him, said that the motion of the outermost sphere is not motion in 
place but motion in situs [position in place]. This is against Aristotle, who says in Book V (L. 4) that 
motion is present only in three genera, namely, quality, quantity, and “where.” Avicenna’s position is 
untenable because it is impossible that motion strictly speaking be in a genus the notion of whose species 
consists in an indivisible. For the reason why there is not motion in the genus “substance” is that the nature 
of every species of substance consists in an indivisible, due to the fact that the species of substances do not 
admit of more or less; on this account, since motion is successive, a substantial form is not made existent 
by motion but by generation, which is the terminus of motion. The case is different with whiteness and like 
things, which can be participated according to more or less. But every species of situs has a nature that 
consists in an indivisible, so that if anything be added or taken away the original species does not remain. 
Hence it is impossible for motion to exist in the genus of situs. Besides, the same difficulty remains. 
For situs taken as a predicament implies the order of parts in place; although if it be taken as a difference in 
the genus of quantity it implies merely an order of parts in a whole. Therefore, whatever is moved 
according to situs, must be moved according to place.” 
56
 In Physic., lib. 3 l. 5 n. 16: Sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta quae 
sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales 
denominationes. Nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, sumitur per modum denominationis 
praedicamentum passionis: et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. Et sic patet solutio primae 
dubitationis. “This makes it clear that although motion is one, yet there are two predicaments which are 
based on motion depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental 
denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which as from something external the predicament 
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of “passion” is taken; and the patient is some other thing from which something in denominated an agent. 
This solves the first difficulty (mentioned in 321).” 
57
 In Physic., lib. 3 l. 5 n. 17: Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus 
ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut 
supra dictum est. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam 
inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in actum, 
non est nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et 
passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut 
dictum est. “Therefore, in regard to what there is of motion in external reality, motion is placed reductively 
in that genus which terminates the motion, as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as stated above (no. 
281). But in regard to what reason apprehends about motion, namely, that it is midway between two-terms, 
here the notion of cause and effect are brought in; because for something to be reduced from potency to act 
an agent cause is required. From this aspect, motion pertains to the predicaments of “action” and “passion”; 
for these two predicaments are based on the notions of acting cause and of effect, as was said above (no. 
322).” 
58
 Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 3 n. 10: Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero. Inquirit quorum sit 
quod quid erat esse. Et primo movet quaestionem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, at vero secundum se dictorum. 
Dicit ergo primo, quod sunt quaedam composita in aliis praedicamentis, et non solum in substantia. Quod 
quidem dicit propter hoc, quod substantiarum sensibilium, quae sunt compositae, quidditatem inquirit. 
Sicut enim in substantiis sensibilibus compositis est materia, quae subiicitur formae substantiali, ita etiam 
alia praedicamenta habent suum subiectum. Est enim aliquod subiectum unicuique eorum, sicut qualitati et 
quantitati et quando et ubi et motui, sub quo comprehenditur agere et pati. Unde sicut quoddam 
compositum est ignis ex materia et forma substantiali, ita est quaedam compositio ex substantiis et 
accidentibus. 1315. Now since there are (580). He inquires to what things essence belongs. First, he raises 
the question; and second (581:C 1318) he answers it (“But neither”). He accordingly says, first (580), that 
there are certain composites in the case of the other categories and not merely in that of substance. He says 
this because he is investigating the quiddity of sensible substances, which are composite. For just as 
composite sensible substances have matter, which is the subject of substantial forms, so also do the other 
categories have their own subject. For there is some subject of each of them, namely, of quality, quantity, 
when, where, and also of motion, in which are included both action and being acted upon. Hence just as fire 
is a composite of matter and substantial form, in a similar way there is a kind of composition of substance 
and accidents. 
